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Appellee, Utah Department of Health, Division of Health 
Care Financing, having filed its Brief, Appellants now submit 
their Reply Brief. 
THE UTAH STATE MEDICAID PLAN IS DEFECTIVE IN 
THAT IT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH TH? SUBSTANTIVE 
LIMITATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATUTJE. 
In its responsive brief, as It did throughout the 
lengthy proceedings below, the State Department of Health con-
tinues a familiar theme* Its ideal world) is one in which it is 
never bothered by providers about rates, insulated by the impene-
trable wall, the flat rate, and its apparently sincere belief the 
flat rate is not subject to judicial review, much less that the 
Department should be subjected to the annoying task of listening 
to a providerfs evidence concerning costs and efficiencies. 
If the Department's view of the law holds true, then 
indeed providers are truly at the mercy of the government, having 
virtually no opportunity to be heard regarding the application of 
the rates to them. The State's answer to 
plaints about the application of the rak 
providers who have com-
:e is essentially, "be 
satisfied with the rates or get out." While this may certainly 
be a convenient way for the Department to ideal with this problem, 
it hardly comports with ordinary notions of due process, much 
less the plain language of the statute ancfl regulations. 
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r ever, it must be kept 
Appellant does not argue with the proposition that the 
statute 42 U.S.C.§ 1396(a)(13)(A), the si-called "Boren Amend-
ment," was intended to give the states greater flexibility in 
administering their Medicaid programs. Ho\ 
in mind at all times, that the Medicaid program is indeed a 
federal program, determined by federal statutes and regulations, 
and given the massive federal outlay for this program,^ it 
can hardly be said that it was Congress' intent to give the 
states totally free and unfettered discretion in which to con-
duct their Medicaid programs. Clearly, wh 
flexibility in the implementation of the! 
programs, each state, like it or not, is tethered to the federal 
lie states do have some 
ir individual Medicaid 
go, Harris v. McCray, requirements beyond which they might not 
448 U.S. 297 (1980). There is a responsibility which comes with 
the federal match, and when there is a question as to whether 
that state responsibility has been violated, can the states be 
heard to say that the flexibility granted the states by Congress 
leaves the Courts powerless to decide such a question? Appar-
ently, the Department wishes to confuse flexibility and discre-
tion with license. They refuse to accept the fact that Congress, 
1 Under current law, the federal government and the 
various state governments are expected tojspend $25.9 billion and 
$21.3 billion respectively in 1987 to finance health care for 
indigent Americans. Office of Management and Budget, Executive 
Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government, 
at 5-102 (Fiscal Year 1987). 
-2-
by virtue of the statute itself and its pjlain language, placed 
certain "substantive limitations" upon state Medicaid plans and 
rates. Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F.Sup. 879 (W.D.Tex. 1983); 
Nebraska Health Care Association v. Dunning, 778 F.2d. 1291 (8th 
Cir. 1985). The very essence of Appellants1 claim is that the 
State has exceeded or ignored those substantive limitations. In 
the Senate Report quoted by the Appellee in its brief, the 
Committee, while noting the increased flexibility of the new 
statute, still recognized the underlying federal law. 
The Committee Bill deletes 
language . . . and substitutes language which 
gives the states flexibility and 
subject to the statutory requirements of this 
section to formulate their own 
the present 
discretion, 
it
methods and 
standards of payment. 
Senate Report No. 96-471, 96 Congress, 2nd Session, reprinted 
in 4 CCH Medicaid and Medicare Guide, paragraph 24,407 at H780-81 
(1981), quoted in Brief of Appellee at 9J 
whatever payment system is developed by a 
indeed subject to the "statutory requirements." As already 
At all times, then, 
state, that system is 
pointed out in the opening brief at [length, the statutory 
requirement is that rates be "reasonable ahd adequate to meet the 
costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically 
operated facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A). 
In its brief, the state makes mucfh of the fact that the 
nursing home industry apparently did not voice great opposition 
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to the proposed flat rate system at the tlime it was being con-
sidered. Of course, the nursing home industry has no lawmaking 
authority. Additionally, aside from the njirsing home industry's 
position being generally irrelevant as to 
the plan adopted meets the statutory requirl 
larly irrelevant as applied to the Appe 
Appellants were not the owners of Weber Memorial at the time the 
flat-rate system was adopted. Secondly] as the record will 
reflect, the industry, upon threat of mbving to a much less 
desirable, almost punitive, reimbursement ipethod, acceded to the 
flat-rate idea. The State would posit, 
providers were virtually uniform and vigojrous in their support 
for a wonderful new system, the "flat rate 
be asserting some type of estoppel defens 
McFall points out that there was a very re^ 
Mr. Mason, the Executive Director of the 
the issue of whether 
ements, it is particu-
llants here. First, 
in essence, that the 
" The State seems to 
b here. However, Mr. 
1 threat being made by 
Department of Health, 
that a 51st percentile system would be adapted if the providers 
did not agree to something else. Many of the providers, wishing 
to avoid the percentile system, then, wer^ persuaded to support 
the flat rate plan. Transcript at 160. 
The State maintains that "the Federal Government has 
permitted States to define efficiency and economy in terms of the 
rate itself." Brief of Appellee at 14-15. It cites the preamble 
to the regulations composed by the federal agency from the 
Federal Register, wherein it is stated thatj: 
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We have also decided not to maridate that 
the states' plans specifically prpvide a defi-
nition of 'efficiently and economically oper-
ated facility.' The reason for Ithis is that 
the states methods and standards implicitly 
act as the states' definition 
ciently and economically operated 
no explicit definition is necessa 
of an effi-
facility and 
|ry. 
should be emphasized Federal Register, p. 56049 (1983). It 
that the comments from the Federal Register do not appear in the 
regulations themselves, nor do they refer to a flat-rate reim-
bursement system. Further, even if this Statement is taken as a 
correct statement of the law, which Appellants do not concede, it 
still requires that the underlying rates are developed through 
"methods and standards which meet Federal requirements." It is 
this circuitous statement from the federal agency which appar-
ently lies at the heart of the hearing officer's decision, 
(Addendum to Brief of Appellant at 1Q-11), as well as the 
District Court's finding. As was pointed out previously, accept-
ance of the notion that the rate acts; as the definition of 
"efficiently and economically operated" for purposes of testing 
compliance with the statute, essentiality leaves us without a 
standard at all. 
The State describes at length tthe history of the pre-
vious statutes as compared to the current statute, yet is never 
able to explain away the fact that Congress set a substantive 
standard as mentioned above. Either Congress meant what it said 
or it did not. Appellants argue that It did, Appellees argue 
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that it did not. The words of a statute 
strictly as they are plainly written.tf 
Granite School District v. Salt Lake City 
should be "interpreted 
Board of Education of 
(Utah 1983). See also, Maine v. Thibouto 
, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 
t, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); 
Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971). 
The Appellee cites Mary Washington Hospital, Inc. v< 
Fisher, 635 F.Supp. 891 (E.D.Va. 1985), fo^ the proposition that 
it need not make written findings. While this is a rather 
tenuous proposition in itself, even if assjimed to be an accurate 
statement of law, the State fails to point out where its "unwrit-
ten11 findings are. 
Also cited is Coalition of Michigan Nursing Homes, Inc. 
v. Dempsey, 537 F.Supp. 451 (D.C.Mich. 1982), in support of 
Appellee's argument concerning the definition of "economically 
and efficiently operated." Appellee refers to the decision as a 
rejection of the idea that "federal regulations require a review 
of all facilities on an individual basis to determine the impact 
of the [rate]." Brief of Appellee at 16. However, the decision 
should be read in context. First, it should be kept in mind that 
the case was a preliminary injunction action, and the standard is 
somewhat different. Secondly, with respept to the Plaintiff's 
claim that "the rates as a whole do not reflect provider's 
costs," Id. at 463, the Court merely held that the provider had 
not "provided sufficient facts, nor framed the issue of this 
motion in a manner which allows the Court to address the much 
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s and standards. Keep 
broader question/1 Additionally, the quoted portion of the case, 
See Brief of Appellee at 16, refers to 42 C.F.R. § 447.255, a 
regulation which required that "quantified estimates11 be sub-
mitted when the state made a "significant change in its methods 
and standards for determining the rates." !&_. The Court simply 
found that the particular rate change ib question was not a 
"significant change" in the state's methods 
in mind that the rate change in Michigan was a relatively modest 
amendment to the existing state plan and was not a major change 
in reimbursement methodology, contrary to the case in Utah when 
the state converted from the pre-Boren Amendment reimbursement 
system to the flat rate system. Therefore, the portion of the 
Dempsey case referred to by the Appellee has no application 
here. 
The State next argues that "th^re is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the rate was set arbitrarily or capri-
ciously." Brief of Appellee at 17. However, to the contrary, 
the record demonstrates that the rate setting process itself was 
conducted in an arbitrary manner. The Statte admits that it never 
conducted any examination of any facility 
lated the flat rate. See e.g., Deposit 
Sharon Wasek; Transcript at 690-92. The State acknowledges, that 
it has no real knowledge of the actual operations of any facil-
ity. Transcript at 26; 32; 154. 
at the time it formu-
ions of F. Roy Dunn, 
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As pointed out in some length in Appellant's opening 
brief, the "findings11 and "assurances" requirements of the fed-
eral regulations are not merely surplusagle. That is, they are 
intended to require the states to conduct some type of "objective 
analysis" which will provide a basis for 
federal government that the rates are reasl 
meet the cost of economically and efficiently operated facil-
ities. Nebraska Health Care Association, 
the assurances to the 
onable and adequate to 
supra; and Thomas v, 
feels it is insulated 
Johnston, supra. Apparently because the flat rate was unani-
mously adopted, and then approved and certified by the Department 
of Health and Human Services, the State 
from any inquiry as to the underlying basi^ of those findings and 
assurances. However, for the Appeal provisions cited earlier to 
have any meaning at all, the provider must |have this opportunity. 
Certainly a fact-finder may disagree with (Weber Memorial's con-
tention that it is efficiently and economically operated under 
the circumstances, but it must have the ££ 
showing. Otherwise, the appeals process is obviously not mean-
ingful. Mary Washington Hospital, Inc., supra. 
portunity to make that 
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II 
THE EVIDENTIARY RULING 
The Appellee steadfastly defend^ the ruling below in 
which proffered evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and efficien-
cies was found inadmissible. Brief of Appellee at 25-31. The 
Appellee maintains this evidence is totally irrelevant. Because 
it is no longer constrained by the pre-Boren Amendment, "reason-
able costs" standard, Appellee takes the position that it no 
longer need be bothered by any concern for costs. However, the 
Appellee does concede that costs may be considered in a rate 
appeal which concerns "the needs of medicaid recipients." Brief 
of Appellee at 27-28. 
The simplest answer to the Appellee's position is that 
it is directly contrary to the applicable regulations. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 447.253 states that: 
The Medicaid agency must provide an appeals 
or exception procedure that allows individual 
providers an opportunity to submit additional 
evidence and receive administrative review ... 
of payment rates. 
(Emphasis added). Appellee brushes asicSe the import of the 
regulation by indicating that the regulation "allows maximum 
state discretion in establishing such appeals or exception pro-
cess." Because the rate acts as the definition of "efficiently 
and economically operated facility," the State maintains, all 
providers are lumped together, and presumably, the reference to 
"individual providers" and the "opportunity to submit additional 
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evidence" has no meaning* Brief of Appellee at 37. However, the 
federal agency responsible for administering and regulating the 
Medicaid program clearly had much more iq mind when it drafted 
the appeals procedure requirement. 
In general the September 30, 1981 interim 
final regulations implemented th 
[42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(a)] 
for: 
ese statutes 
[by providing 
A requirement that States devlelop appeals 
procedures that will give individual facili-
ties an opportunity to seek administrative 
review of their payment rates. 
(Emphasis added). 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046^47 (Dec. 19, 1983). 
Further, the agency pointed out that: 
In response to the concern regarding a 
State explanation as to why a provider is not 
considered an efficiently and economically 
operated facility, we would note that HCFA 
regulations at 42 CFR § 447.258 include a 
requirement that the State agency must providT 
an appeal procedure to address the expressed 
concern of those individual facilities who" 
believe they are efficient and economical but 
are being adversely affected by a State's 
payment rate. 
(Emphasis added). 48 Fed. Reg. 56,050 (|Dec. 19, 1983). The 
agency also stated that, "We believe that fair and reasonable 
adjustments are implicit in an appeals process. . . . " Id. at 
56,052. See also, Mary Washington Hospital, Inc. v. Fisher, 635 
F.Supp. 891, 906 (E.D.Va. 1985). It dbesn't seem that the 
message could be any plainer: the appeal 
"individual facilities" the opportunity to 
s process must permit 
seek administrative 
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review of "their payment rates" and to Address their concerns 
that they are efficiently and economically operated and are yet 
not having their costs met, and that, if the agency is thusly 
convinced, to seek "fair and reasonable adjustments" to the rates 
"T 
paid them. 
If an individual provider is to obtain a rate adjust-
ment, it seems obvious that the "additional evidence" which the 
agency must hear includes evidence regarding the provider's costs 
and efficiencies. 
Even if it is accepted arguendo ^hat the general rates 
set by Utah are not in violation of federal law, those rates may 
still not be in compliance with the law when applied in a partic-
ular case. As the Court in Mary Washington Hospital, supra, 
stated: 
While the Court has determined that the 
general rates Virginia has set for hospital 
reimbursement are not in conflict with the 
governing federal law, this conclusion does 
not mean, however, that those general rates 
will be adequate in every case. por a variety 
of reasons, reasonable general rates may not 
be reasonable and adequate in particular cases 
to assure reasonable access and to cover the 
costs of efficiently and economically running 
a hospital. This may be due to some special 
fact about a hospital or group of hospitals 
that the state did not take into account in 
setting the general rate. Or, although a gen-
eral rate may originally have peen adequate 
for a given hospital, it may become inadequate 
when technology or other circumstances 
necessitate a change in the slervice being 
provided. 
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Whatever the reason, the approp 
deal with this problem . . . is 
form of appeals or exception p 
fact, the more general the rate-s 
is, [such as Utah's statewide 
the stronger the need for some 
riate way to 
through some 
rocess. In 
ting system et 
r|ate system] , 
appropriate 
method of accommodating particular situations 
that the general rules do nott adequately 
address. If,at the othe r extreme, a 
state fixed a single reimbursement rate across 
the state, there would almost certainly be a 
need for a broader form of appeal lor exception 
process that would allow individual hospitals 
relief from the general rule. 
(Emphasis added in part). Id. at 903. 
Weber's appeal hardly raises the specter referred to by 
the State, in which "bitter disputes" will rage "over whether 
snowmobiles could be considered a 'reasonable expense' related to 
patient care." Brief of Appellee at 30. Weber Memorial has been 
attempting for almost four years now to make a simple point: that 
the general rate set by the State, given the special historical 
circumstances of Weber Memorial, including the transition from a 
public to a private facility, its special mix of patients requir-
ing extraordinary care and services, etc.J in Weber Memorial's 
particular case, is not reasonable and adequate to meet its costs. 
Additionally, Weber Memorial has been prepared for all these years 
to demonstrate that, under the circumstances, it is indeed an 
efficiently and economically operated facility. To date, no-one 
has been willing to listen to evidence of thf.s nature. 
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The other interesting point mad£ by Appellee in this 
regard is that rate appeals are apparently acceptable if they 
concern "patient care," but not if they affect only the provider. 
Brief of Appellee at 26. How it is possible to neatly separate 
the interests of the providers and patientp is not explained. As 
one Court recently held: 
Private health-care provider^ caring for 
Medicaid patients • . . also have a direct 
financial interest in the availability of 
Medicaid reimbursement. In several cases, 
courts have permitted providers to bring 
actions to enforce the Medicaid statutes. 
California Hosp. Ass'n v. Obledo, 602 F.2d 
1357 (9th Cir. 1979); Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. 
v. Weiner, 569 F.2d 1T56 (1st Cir. 1978); 
California Ass'n. of Bioanalysts • v. Rank, 577 
F.Supp. W+Tt 1347 n. 5 (C.D. Cal. T983). 
These cases have recognized that Medicaid 
patients and health-care providers have par-
allel interests with respect to Medicaid 
funding and reimbursement. 
(Emphasis added). Coos Bay Care Center v. State of Oregon, 
Department of Human Resources, 803 F.2d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 
1986). In reality, almost every rate appeal case will affect 
the "parallel interests" of the patients arid providers. In fact, 
in many respects, the provider has a more direct interest. It is 
certainly the provider, not the patient, tihat must "incur costs" 
in providing care in conformance with federal and state laws and 
regulations. It is the provider which must conduct his opera-
tions in an "efficient and economic" manner so as to be eligible 
for reimbursement. It is the provider that has the economic 
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stake in making certain that state Medicai4 plans, at least their 
reimbursement aspects, are conducted in accordance with the 
federal statute and regulations. 
At one point Appellee states thati, "[i]f Weber Memorial 
had come to the hearing offering evidence that it cared for a 
patient group with specialized needs, such evidence would have 
been admissible," (Brief of Appellee at 28), and later asserts 
that Weber's concerns and evidence concern 
tion of a large number of patients is "evenl 
the previous arguments.11 Id. at 31. Not 
self-contradictory, but apparently fails td> 
is a connection between the misclassificati 
fng the misclassifica-
less substantial than 
only is the position 
recognize that there 
on and the failure of 
the rates to meet the "reasonable and adequate11 standard. In 
Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F.Supp. 879, 893 
Court found it "highly relevant," in determining whether the 
(W.D. Tex. 1983), the 
the costs which must 
operated facilities, 
rates were reasonable and adequate to meet 
be incurred by efficiently and economically 
that some providers "are responsible for the care of a greater 
proportion of persons whose needs are greater, and therefore 
whose care is more costly than other providers." Id. This is 
precisely the point Appellant has raised throughout the proceed-
ings below, but which fell upon deaf ears. See, e.g., Brief In 
Support of Retention for Judicial Reviey at 27-28; Hearing 
Transcript at 463-66. 
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not disagree that the 
III 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The State misperceives Appellant'^ point with respect to 
the standard of review. Appellant does 
statutory standard, U.C.A. § 26-23-2, would apply to findings of 
fact. However, an appellate court need not apply that deferen-
tial standard to questions of law. This is clearly pointed out 
in the Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of Employment 
case, and is axiomatic. There would rea ily be no purpose for 
appellate courts if they were always required to defer to the 
legal conclusions of lower courts. Appel lee has pointed to no 
exceptions to the rule that as to questions of law, the "review 
is plenary with no deference accorded the 
mmation. Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of 
[itself insulated from 
the State agency has 
Employment, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982)| 
Not only would the State have 
judicial scrutiny by its proposition that 
total discretion with regard to findings 4n^ assurances and its 
contention that it does not have to hear evidence from an 
individual facility regarding costs and efficiencies, but also in 
its contention that the standard of review is such that an 
appellate court must apply the extremely deferential standard to 
conclusions of law as well as to findings of fact. It is 
submitted that this is simply not the standard in Utah or any 
other jurisdiction. 
administrative deter-
-15-
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments submitted herein and in 
Appellant's previous brief, Weber Memorial would again respect-
fully request that the Court rule that the flat rate system is in 
violation of federal law. Alternatively, Appellant requests the 
opportunity to submit evidence to the District Court or a hearing 
office, with the opportunity to demonstrate that it is an effi-
ciently and economically operated facility! within the meaning of 
federal law, yet is not having its costs met within the flat 
rate. Additionally, Weber Memorial also seeks a reversal of the 
previous rulings concerning the classification of patients. 
DATED this \\ day of June, 1987J 
HOUPT, ECKERSLY & DOWNES 
u\».. 
William Dowses, Jr. 
LOJEK & HALIj, CTD. 
Donald W. Lorjek 
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